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Abstract
We analyze the impact of misperceptions of the unemployment rate on individual
wages, using the European Social Survey. We follow a threefold strategy to tackle
potential endogeneity problems, as the model includes the following: controls for
worker’s ability, the regional unemployment rate, and country fixed effects. We
estimate interval regression models. When subjective perceptions overstate the
country unemployment rate, a one percentage point gap between the perceived and
the actual rates reduces wages by 0.4 to 0.7 %. We discuss a potential mechanism. A
pessimistic view of the labor market leads to concern over own employment
prospects, lowering perceived bargaining power and reservation wages.
JEL Classification: J31; D80
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1 Introduction
The social sciences share an interest in the study of the accuracy of individuals’ percep-
tions of issues such as the state of the economy or the prevalence of minority groups in
the population. In particular, the search for the factors determining the misperception
of unemployment or current inflation has pointed to the relevance of personality traits
(Orland 2013), education, cognitive ability, income or wealth, and exposure to media,
together with own experience and the situation prevailing in one’s region of residence (see
Kunovich 2013; Duffy and Lunn 2009; Blanchflower and Kelly 2008; Conover et al. 1986).
In turn, the analysis of the consequences of inaccurate perceptions of the economic situa-
tion has concentrated on individuals’ attitudes and behavior. Kunovich (2013) shows that
misperception of the unemployment rate has an impact on people’s views on democracy,
the role of the State, and labor conflicts. Duffy and Lunn (2009) report that individuals’
misperception of current inflation is negatively related to both consumption and savings
intentions.
We contribute to this literature by analyzing the implications of misperceptions of
the state of the labor market on actual personal outcomes. Specifically, we evaluate
the impact of the misperception of labor market tightness—unemployment rate—on
individual wages. Our analysis relies on a direct measure of labor market knowledge
imperfections to evaluate its impact on labor market returns.
We exploit information gathered by the European Social Survey (ESS), which included
in its 2008 wave a question on the respondents’ degree of information about the job
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market. More precisely, individuals were asked for an estimate of the unemployment rate
in their country. We take the deviation between their answers and the actual unemploy-
ment rate in the country as the degree of misperception of the job market situation. This
index is used to explore the extent to which labor market knowledge affects individual
behavior and thus labor market outcomes. In particular, if a pessimistic view of the unem-
ployment rate is associated with concern over becoming unemployed, it will influence
workers’ decisions, namely on the reservation wage, which would be set too low.
The ESS reveals that workers’ perceptions of labor market tightness, though related to
the actual phenomenon, are remarkably imprecise. This evidence on widespread infor-
mation misperceptions in the labor market is corroborated by (rare) surveys where this
type of questions is asked (see Ipsos MORI 2014; Curtin 2008; Papacostas 2008; Fullone
et al. 2008). In any case, evidence on its impact on economic outcomes is lacking.
Our empirical strategy departs from the estimation of Mincer-augmented wage regres-
sions, which include controls for the worker attributes, firm- and job-related attributes,
and family demographics. Given that the outcome variable is measured in intervals, we
estimate interval regression models and, as a robustness check, ordered probit models.
We tackle potential endogeneity problems that may affect our initial estimates. Indeed, if
individual- or country-level unobserved factors that influence wage setting are correlated
with the degree of labor market knowledge imperfections, our initial estimates will be
biased. Such will be the case if, for example, individuals perceive the unemployment rate
by looking at individuals in their circle, namely their region or education level. We adopt
a threefold strategy to handle this problem: controlling for the regional unemployment
rate, which could influence an individual’s perceptions of the country unemployment rate
and has been widely documented as a determinant of wages, according to the wage curve
literature (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994); controlling for country fixed effects, which
will capture any countrywide factors common to all individuals, such as the institutional
setting, mobility costs, or labor market tightness; and controlling for worker ability, based
on two proxy variables reported in the dataset by the survey interviewer.
Section 2 describes the data and the key variables used, while Section 3 discusses specif-
ically the indicator of labor market misperceptions. The empirical models are introduced
in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results and discusses potential mechanisms. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2 Dataset
The ESS focuses on Europe’s institutions and the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior patterns
of its population (ESS 2008a,b). It provides information at the individual level covering
more than 30 countries, with 1500 to 3000 respondents per country. Seven cross-sections
of data are available, as the survey was implemented from 2002 to 2014 on a biennial
basis. A core set of issues, common across rounds, is surveyed in each round, providing
extensive information on demographics, socio-economics, and social-political orienta-
tion and activity, among other topics. Additionally, a rotating section is devoted in each
round to specific issues, which can be repeated in later rounds. The rotating section has
focused on themes such as immigration, democracy, justice, economic morality, or wel-
fare attitudes. The dataset further includes details on how each interview was carried out,
in particular on the ability of the respondent to understand the questions, as perceived by
the interviewer.
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We rely on data from the 2008 round,1 which, under the “welfare attitudes” section,
asked respondents for their perception of the unemployment rate in their country. Inter-
views for this round took place between 2007 and 2009. Within each country, interviews
may span over a few months.
Two questions in the survey are of particular relevance for the analysis to be undertaken:
the household income and the perceived unemployment rate reported by the survey
respondent. The latter will be the object of Section 3.
The ESS reports the net household income from all sources earned by the household
members, coded into country-specific income deciles. We implemented several checks
on the income variable. It is well known that survey respondents are particularly reluc-
tant to reveal their income and, as a result, non-response is usually acute for this type of
questions. There is also concern over income misreporting, which is more likely when-
ever one single question on the total household income is asked, instead of a separate
question on each income component and earner (Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Warner 2006;
Micklewright and Schnepf 2010), or when the respondent is not the main income earner
in the household.
Our first check on the income variable consisted on excluding countries whose income
data was not collected in a comparable way: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Slovakia, and Turkey (ESS
2010, pp. 14, 15, 20, 21). We have as well excluded countries where a major share of the
households did not report their income. This particular non-response item affected over
one fourth of the respondents in the following countries: Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece,
Israel, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland, which were therefore dropped from the analy-
sis.2 Observations with missing income were naturally excluded from the analysis and
therefore the second check on the income variable aimed at detecting whether income
non-response was subject to any systematic pattern. We find that respondents who are
not in paid employment (in particular students) and households whose main income
source is self-employment are less likely to report their income.3 This type of concern
over non-response, together with the aims of our analysis of the labor market, determined
the constraints to be imposed on the analysis sample.
Our goal is to quantify the impact of the unemployment misperception by the respon-
dent on his labor income, in the spirit of a worker-level wage regression. The survey
provides information on the total income of the household, which will coincide with the
respondent’s labor income if he is the single wage earner in a household that does not ben-
efit from other sources of income.We therefore imposed a set of constraints on the sample
to be analyzed. We restricted the analysis to households whose main source of income
is wages or salaries; whose respondent’s main activity is paid work and whose employ-
ment relationship is a labor contract (employee, thus excluding the self-employed or those
working for a family business); and consisting of the respondent and, for multi-person
households, the partner and/or children below age 16. This latter condition excluded in
particular households where the respondent was the offspring of other household mem-
bers. This restriction fulfills a twofold purpose. On the one hand, we keep only households
whose members’ economic activity and thus income source can be identified, given that
the survey provides that information for the respondent and the partner, but not other
household members. On the other hand, we aim at reducing the extent of income mis-
reporting, more likely to occur when the respondent is not the main income earner but
instead his offspring. We also purged the dataset of any pension or old-age benefits by
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dropping households with members aged 65 or older. Finally, we kept only households
where the partner does not work for the market (is a houseperson). As such, we guaran-
tee that the respondent is the single wage earner, for whom we can thus estimate a wage
function.
The final analysis sample comprises 2310 observations on 16 countries4, and it is meant
to be representative of the wage-earner population. We can have an indication as to
whether this aim was accomplished by comparing later the estimates on the coefficients
of the control variables in the wage regression to the benchmarks from the previous
literature.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. The average gap between the perceived and the
actual unemployment rate is 13 percentage points. Whereas the majority of the individu-
als (78%) overestimate the unemployment rate, thus having a pessimistic view of the labor
market, 9 % underestimate it. In any case, the latter group has a remarkably more accu-
rate view of the labor market, as their average misperception of the unemployment rate is
down to 3 percentage points (in absolute value). Note that the sample is rather balanced
in terms of gender: 59% males and 41% females. The average age of the respondents is 40
years. A share of 40% completed tertiary education, whereas 43% completed upper sec-
ondary education. An ability indicator derived from the interviewer’s appraisal indicates
that 96% understood the questions very often or often (ability1) and 77% of the respon-
dents never or almost never required clarifications to the questions being asked (ability2).
The firm size distribution points to a certain concentration of employment in the follow-
ing: small- andmedium-sized firms (the omitted category), with 59% of employment, and
the services, with 67% of employment. Ten percent of the workforce works part time, and
83% are on an open-ended contract; 26% are affiliated with a trade union.
3 The indicator of unemployment misperception
The respondents in the ESS 2008 were asked to provide an estimate of the unemployment
rate in their country, under the exact phrasing, “Of every 100 people of working age in
your country how many would you say are unemployed and looking for work? Choose
your answer from this card. If you are not sure please give your best guess” (ESS 2008c,
p. 25).5 Respondents were shown 11 intervals to choose from, with the first ten having
a common width (0–4, 5–9, and so forth up to 45–49), and the final one reading “50 or
more.”
The degree of misperception will be captured by the discrepancy between the perceived
unemployment rate declared by the survey respondent and the actual unemployment rate
in the country the month the interview took place.6 The monthly unemployment rate was
collected from Eurostat (2013).
We computed the unemployment misperception as:
ugap = m([ a, b] ) − u, (1)
where [ a, b] stands for the bracket of perceived unemployment rate; m is its midpoint,
considered as the representative value; and u is the actual unemployment rate in the
country at the referencemoment (for details on interval arithmetic, seeMoore et al. 2009).
Figure 1 reports this gap between the perceived and actual unemployment rates.
Interestingly, in every country, an overwhelming majority of the working population
overestimates the unemployment rate. Nevertheless, there are striking differences across
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics, analysis sample
Variable Mean or share St. dev.
(Log) earnings, lower bound of decile (Euro) 7.353 0.659
(Log) earnings, upper bound of decile (Euro) 7.456 0.648
Misperception unemployment, p.p. (abs value) 12.81 13.03
If misperception positive 16.03 13.08
If misperception negative 3.084 2.007
Share of workers
With misperception positive 0.781
With misperception negative 0.087
(Log) regional unemployment rate 1.803 0.378
Female 0.405
Age 40.12 11.14





Firm size (1–99 omitted)
100–500 0.230
500+ 0.184






Clerks, serv., sales 0.240
Skilled, machine opers 0.204
Managers, profls., technicians 0.459
Part-timer 0.102
Supervisor 0.365
Open end contract 0.828
Trade union member 0.264
Children below 16 (yes/no) 0.257
Partner (yes/no) 0.167
Number obs.a 2310
Source: Computations are based on ESS (2008). Notes: The misperception index is computed according to Eq. 1 (i.e., the
difference between the perceived and the actual unemployment rate in the country); to compute the share of workers with
non-zero (i.e., positive or negative) misperception, we rounded the gap to the closest integer. ability1 equals one if the
respondent understood the questions very often or often and zero otherwise; ability2 equals one if the respondent never or
almost never required clarifications on the questions and zero otherwise. The computations use ESS post-stratification weights
combined with population size weights
a88 observations on earnings are left-censored and 89 are right-censored; data is missing for 11, 7, and 37 observations, on
ability1, ability2, and part-timer, respectively. For the regional unemployment rate, the number of observations is 1700, as data are
not available for four countries (see text)
countries. For instance, in the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) and
in Germany, over half the population provides an answer that does not diverge from the
actual unemployment rate by more than 5 percentage points. Conversely, that share falls
below a quarter of the respondents in Hungary, Latvia, Romania, or the UK.
Figure 2 confronts the actual and the average perceived unemployment rates across
countries, highlighting once again the tendency for the overestimation of the unem-
ployment rate. Whereas any point along the diagonal line would mean that, on average,





























-20 0 20 40 60 -20 0 20 40 60 -20 0 20 40 60 -20 0 20 40 60
BE DE DK EE
FI FR GB HU
IE LV NL NO






gap between perceived and actual unemployment rate (p.p.)
Fig. 1 Distribution of the gap between the perceived and the actual unemployment rate, separately by
country. Source: Computations based on ESS (2008) and Eurostat (2013). Notes: The gap in the perception of
unemployment was computed as ugap = m[ a, b]−u, where [ a, b] refers to the interval of perceived
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Fig. 2 Actual unemployment rate versus perceived unemployment rate, by country. Source: Computations
based on ESS (2008) and Eurostat (2013). Notes: The gap in the perception of unemployment was computed
as ugap = m[ a, b]−u, where [ a, b] refers to the interval of perceived unemployment rate,m indicates the
midpoint, and u is the actual unemployment rate in the country at the reference moment
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respondents in the country estimate correctly the unemployment rate, we find, instead,
that all the dots lie far above the 45° line. Despite this general pattern, the striking differ-
ences across countries are confirmed. The Scandinavian countries, Finland, and Germany
present a low misperception of the unemployment rate; on the contrary, in Hungary,
Romania, Ireland, Slovenia, the UK, France, and Belgium, there is, on average, a large
misperception of the unemployment rate. Papacostas (2008) undertook a cross-country
comparison of misperceptions of economic indicators, in particular the unemployment
rate. The comparison with our findings is hampered by the fact that in his survey
respondents were given the explicit option not to reply to the question: in 25 out of 28
countries, over one fourth of the respondents chose to do so; in 11 countries, over half
the respondents did so. Interestingly, however, an accurate perception of unemployment
in our sample is associated with a low non-response rate in Papacostas’ sample. Indeed,
the Scandinavian countries, Finland, and Germany rank lowest in non-response among
the countries that overlap with our study; conversely, Romania ranks highest. In any
case, comparing the average misperception, we find that Hungary, Belgium, the UK, and
Slovenia also present among the largest degrees of misperception in Papacostas’ study,
while Sweden presents one of the lowest. A low misperception in France is the exception
to the general consistency with our study (Papacostas 2008, p. 192).
One might have expected countries with low unemployment rate to have a low misper-
ception of unemployment, if we quantify the misperception as the difference between the
levels of perceived and actual rates. In this case, any gap of a given magnitude, suppose
1 percentage point, will mean a more serious mistake in a country with a low unemploy-
ment rate than in a country with a high one. Nevertheless, Fig. 2 shows that countries
with the same unemployment rate can have widely different average levels of mispercep-
tion of the unemployment rate—consider the examples of Sweden versus Great Britain or
Estonia versus Hungary.
Therefore, in the empirical specification of the model, we will as well consider the rel-





= log(m[ a, b] ) − log(u), (2)
where all variables keep their meaning from the previous equation.7
Despite the fact that differences across countries in the average misperception of the
unemployment rate may have an interest of their own, the analysis to be undertaken will
exploit within-country variation in the misperception of unemployment to identify its
impact on earnings, by including country fixed effects in all model specifications.
The perceived unemployment rate bears a connection to the actual unemployment rate,
reflected in a correlation of 0.32 across all individuals in our dataset. Nevertheless, the
sizable gap between the perception of unemployment and the actual rate prompts two
questions:What are the determinants of this gap?Will misperceptions of the labormarket
situation have implications on workers’ outcomes?Whereas the latter is the core question
driving this study, in this section, we provide a brief discussion of certain correlates of the
misperception of unemployment.
We are interested in checking whether the misperception of unemployment could be
correlated with an individual’s education level and with his ability. Moreover, we explore
the idea that the regional unemployment rate might influence the individual’s perceptions
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of the national unemployment rate. Workers could be more aware of labor market condi-
tions in their circle, namely their region of residence, than in the country as a whole. If so,
their reported perception of the national unemployment rate would trackmore closely the
regional unemployment rate. As a result, our indicator of labor market knowledge imper-
fections would be larger, the larger the difference between the regional and the national
unemployment rate.
Table 5 in the Appendix reports the results of a regression of the index of unemploy-
ment misperception as a function of our variables of interest, for the active population in
the countries for which the regional unemployment rate is available (see Eurostat (2014)
for the regional unemployment rates at the NUTS1 and NUTS2 levels;8 we assigned
to the Slovenia and The Netherlands finer NUTS3 regions reported in the ESS the
corresponding unemployment rate at the NUTS2 level).9
More educated workers provide a more accurate estimate of the country’s unemploy-
ment rate (the misperception is reduced by 4 percentage points in the case of upper
secondary education and by 8 p.p. in the case of tertiary education, when compared to
the omitted category of lower educational levels). More able workers (who understood
the survey questions and did not need clarifications) also have more accurate percep-
tions of the unemployment rate. Unemployed workers perceive the unemployment rate
to be larger than it actually is, consistent with the idea that own experience influences an
individual’s perception of the situation (with those who have had fewer job offers, such
that they are unemployed, reporting a more pessimistic view of the labor market situa-
tion).Women report less accurately the unemployment rate thanmen, and older workers,
in turn, report it more accurately than younger ones. These findings corroborate evi-
dence by Curtin (2008) on the USA and Fullone et al. (2008) on Italy, when searching for
the determinants of knowledge of economic indicators (such as the unemployment rate,
the inflation rate, and the rate of growth of GDP). In particular, their regression analy-
ses revealed that more educated individuals, older ones, and men have in general more
accurate information on the economy.
The larger the regional unemployment rate, the larger an individual’s misperception of
the national unemployment rate (with a 0.3 percentage point larger misperception for
each p.p. of the regional unemployment rate). Similarly, a larger difference between the
regional and the national unemployment rates is associated with larger misperception of
the national rate by the survey respondents.10
Altogether, in this exploratory analysis, we find support for the relevance of introducing
controls for workers’ ability and for the regional unemployment rate in the regression
that aims at estimating the impact of unemployment misperceptions on wages. Indeed,
these variables are expected to influence the wage level, and they are correlated with the
unemployment misperception. We assume in our analysis that the level of knowledge an
individual possesses about the labor market is an individual trait that did not vary much
between the beginning of the current job spell and the interview date.
4 Empirical strategy
The estimation procedure takes into account the particular nature of the outcome vari-
able (labor income), which was originally coded into country-specific bins, with known
boundaries reported for each country by the ESS methodological documentation. When-
ever the boundaries of the bins were defined in a currency other than the Euro, we have
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converted them into Euro. We rely on interval regression and, in the robustness section,
ordered probit, as two alternative estimation methods to model these interval data.
Let Yi stand for the (log) labor income of individual i, a continuous variable that is
unobserved but is reported to fall on the interval ] y1i, y2i]; in the case of the last decile
that by definition is right-censored, it falls on the interval ] yRi, +∞[; for the first decile,
which is left-censored, it falls on the interval [w, yLi], with w unknown.
Consider the model:
yi = xi′β + i (3)
where y stands for (log) labor income and x includes controls for the worker’s gender, a
quadratic term on age, education (two dummy variables), and occupation (three dum-
mies), as well as indicator variables for part-time work, whether the worker is a supervisor,
holds an open-ended contract, and is unionized; the firm’s size (two dummy variables)
and industry (four dummies) are also controlled for. Additionally, demographic controls
are included: whether the respondent lives with a partner and whether he has children
below age 16. The set of explanatory variables will be introduced sequentially. The key
explanatory variable is the unemployment misperception, our indicator of misinforma-
tion on the labor market situation, computed as the gap between the perceived and the
actual national unemployment rates. This gap is measured alternatively in levels or in
logs, according to Eqs. 1 and 2, respectively. i is assumed to follow a normal distribution
with mean 0 and standard deviation σ .
The likelihood contribution from worker i whose earnings fall on interval ] y1i, y2i] is
Pr(y1i < Yi ≤ y2i); in the case of the right-censored interval, it is Pr(Yi > yRi), and for the
left-censored interval, it is Pr(Yi ≤ yLi). Therefore, the log-likelihood function defined

































where decI refers to the interval data in deciles 2 to 9, decR refers to the right-censored
data in decile 10, and decL refers to the left-censored data in the first decile.  is the
cumulative standard normal distribution; αi is the weight attached to observation i.
We are interested in the marginal impact of the independent variables—in particu-
lar, the unemployment misperception—on earnings, the latent variable. The estimated
β vector directly quantifies the marginal effects of the independent variables on the
latent outcome variable (for the specification and interpretation of the interval regression
model, see Cameron and Trivedi 2005, pp. 529–542). A different situation would occur
if our variable of interest was the censored variable, in which case the marginal impacts
would diverge from the estimated β vector. However, the variable of interest is the con-
tinuous variable, the one traditionally used in empirical models, which is reported by this
particular data source in intervals that are not the object of economic interest.
As discussed in the previous sections, misperceptions of the unemployment rate could
be correlated with the regional unemployment rate, the individual’s unobserved ability, or
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country-specific factors. The estimates of the impact of unemployment misperception on
wages would be biased by the omission of these variables. We follow three steps to tackle
the problem.
First of all, we include the regional unemployment rate among the regressors, to capture
the relationship between the regional unemployment rate and wages, widely documented
as the wage curve. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) report a consistent relationship
between the regional unemployment rate and the regional wage level—an elasticity of
−0.1, with the estimates for a very large set of countries fluctuating around this value.
By controlling for the regional unemployment rate, we aim, on the one hand, at estimat-
ing the impact of information misperceptions on wages netting out the impact of the
regional unemployment rate, thus correcting potential biases due to its omission. On the
other hand, we aim at confronting our estimates of the impact of regional unemployment
on wages with the benchmark estimated in the literature, to have an indication on the
reliability of our overall empirical strategy. We rely on Eurostat (2014) for the regional
unemployment rate, available on a yearly basis.
Secondly, we include country fixed effects among our regressors, which will capture any
countrywide factors common to all individuals, such as labor market tightness, mobility
costs, or the institutional setting. Therefore, our identification of the impact ofmispercep-
tions on wages comes from the variation within country on misperceptions of the labor
market situation.
Thirdly, we control for the worker ability by relying on the two proxy variables reported
by the ESS interviewer when answering the questions, “Overall, did you feel that the
respondent understood the questions?” (ESS 2008c, p. 75) and “Did the respondent ask for
clarification on any questions?” (ESS 2008c, p. 74). The answers were originally coded into
five categories: never, almost never, now and then, often, or very often. We recoded each
of these variables into a dummy variable: ability1 equals one if the respondent understood
the questions very often or often and zero otherwise; ability2 equals one if the respondent
never or almost never required clarifications on the questions and zero otherwise.
Tables 2 and 3 report the estimates of parameters β and σ under different alternative
model specifications. Robustness checks are presented in the Appendix, using the relative
difference between the perceived and the actual unemployment rates or an alternative
estimation method.
5 The impact of informationmisperceptions on wages
Table 2 reports the core results on interval estimation of the impact of unemployment
misperception on wages, relying on data for all countries in the analysis sample. Table 3
replicates all estimations including the control for the regional unemployment rate, rely-
ing on the narrower set of countries for whom this variable is available (i.e., dropping
Estonia, Finland, Ireland, and Latvia). Throughout those tables, country fixed effects are
included in the regressions. Column 1 includes controls for worker attributes (gender, a
quadratic term on age, and two education dummies). Column 2 allows for the impact of
unemployment misperceptions on wages to be different depending on whether the indi-
vidual is pessimistic or optimistic about the current labor market situation. Column 3
further controls for the individual’s ability, as proxied by the two variables reported by the
survey interviewer on the respondent’s understanding of the questions being asked. Col-
umn 4 augments the specification by including firm and job attributes (firm size, industry;
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Table 2 Interval regression, (log) wages on level of misperception of unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Misperception unemployment (abs value) −.007*** −.007*** −.007*** −.004*** −.004***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Misperc. unempl. if neg. (abs value) .010 .011 .002 .002
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.011)
Female −.237*** −.236*** −.235*** −.187*** −.147***
(.029) (.029) (.029) (.030) (.031)
Age .025*** .025*** .025*** .019** .012
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.008)
Age sq. −.0002** −.0002** −.0002** −.0002** −.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.00009) (.00009)
Educ. upper second. .150*** .151*** .143*** .045 .051
(.043) (.043) (.043) (.038) (.038)
Educ. tertiary .423*** .423*** .412*** .180*** .179***
(.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) (.044)
Ability1 −.012 −.066 −.082
(.084) (.081) (.085)
Ability2 .059* −.002 .009
(.031) (.028) (.028)
Firm size 100–500 .070** .059**
(.030) (.029)








Open end contract .186*** .167***
(.034) (.034)




Const. 6.743*** 6.738*** 6.700*** 6.630*** 6.726***
(.175) (.174) (.191) (.174) (.172)
Controls for
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry (4 dummies) No No No Yes Yes
Occupation (3 dummies) No No No Yes Yes
Obs. 2310 2310 2299 2263 2263
Log L −3614.4 −3613.9 −3607.2 −3365.7 −3332.3
σ .410 .410 .409 .364 .357
Source: Computations are based on ESS (2008). Notes: The misperception index is computed according to Eq. 1 (i.e., the
difference between the perceived and the actual unemployment rate in the country); its absolute value is the regressor in line 1;
in line 2, the absolute value of the misperception index is interacted with a dummy variable equal to one if the misperception is
negative and zero otherwise. The computations use ESS post-stratification weights combined with population size weights.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistically significant parameters at *10%, **5%, and ***1% levels
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Table 3 Interval regression, (log) wages on level of misperception of unemployment, including
control for the regional unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Misperception unemployment (abs value) −.007*** −.007*** −.007*** −.004*** −.004***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Misperc. unempl. if neg. (abs value) .011 .011 .002 .002
(.011) (.011) (.011) (.012)
(Log) regional unempl. rate −.126** −.126** −.127** −.101** −.096**
(.051) (.051) (.051) (.044) (.042)
Female −.239*** −.238*** −.236*** −.188*** −.150***
(.030) (.030) (.030) (.031) (.032)
Age .025*** .025*** .026*** .019** .012
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.008) (.008)
Age sq. −.0002** −.0002** −.0002** −.0002* −.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.00009) (.0001)
Educ. upper second. .156*** .158*** .151*** .049 .053
(.046) (.046) (.046) (.040) (.040)
Educ. tertiary .429*** .429*** .419*** .184*** .183***
(.046) (.046) (.046) (.046) (.046)
Ability1 −.024 −.076 −.093
(.089) (.085) (.088)
Ability2 .059* −.002 .009
(.032) (.029) (.029)
Firm size 100–500 .070** .058*
(.032) (.031)








Open end contract .192*** .173***
(.036) (.036)




Const. 6.982*** 6.977*** 6.951*** 6.824*** 6.913***
(.213) (.212) (.224) (.205) (.202)
Controls for
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry (4 dummies) No No No Yes Yes
Occupation (3 dummies) No No No Yes Yes
Obs. 1700 1700 1695 1673 1673
Log L −3446.9 −3446.3 −3441.0 −3208.8 −3176.9
σ .410 .410 .409 .364 .357
Source: Computations are based on ESS (2008). Notes: The misperception index is computed according to Eq. 1 (i.e., the
difference between the perceived and the actual unemployment rate in the country); its absolute value is the regressor in line 1;
in line 2, the absolute value of the misperception index is interacted with a dummy variable equal to one if the misperception is
negative and zero otherwise. The computations use ESS post-stratification weights combined with population size weights.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistically significant parameters at *10%, **5%, and ***1% levels
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the worker’s broad occupation; whether the worker is a part-timer, performs a supervisor
job, holds an open-ended contract, and is unionized). Finally, column 5 adds demographic
controls (whether the worker lives with a partner and has any children). Whereas column
3 provides an indication on the impact of unemployment misperception on wages, col-
umn 4 helps shed light on its mechanisms, as it controls for the attributes of the job the
worker is matched to.
The impact of the regional unemployment rate on wages (Table 3) is remarkably in line
with the wisdom established by the previous literature. Indeed, our results point to an
elasticity of wages with respect to the regional unemployment rate ranging from −.127 to
−.096, whereas Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) derived the “law” of an elasticity of −.1.
The interesting addition to the literature on misperceptions concerns our estimation
of the impact of unemployment misperception on wages (line 1 in either Tables 2 or 3).
We find that each percentage point misperception of the unemployment rate is associ-
ated with a wage decline of 0.7% (see the results in columns 1 to 3)—a misperception of
the labor market situation by 10 p.p. would thus result in a wage penalty of 7%, which
is a noteworthy impact, in particular if one keeps in mind that the average mispercep-
tion is 13 p.p. We further checked whether the impact could be different depending on
whether the worker overshoots or undershoots when evaluating the country’s unemploy-
ment rate. We would expect workers with a pessimistic view of the labor market to lower
their reservation wages and thus earn lower wages; instead, workers with an optimistic
view of the labor market could be overconfident and set too high reservation wages,
though possibly having trouble finding a job. Consistent with that reasoning, we find that
a pessimistic view of the labor market leads to lower wages. An optimistic view, instead,
has no significant impact on wages (as indicated by a formal test on the sum of the esti-
mated coefficients in lines 1 and 2 in each model specification), possibly due to the fact
that very few of these workers underestimate the unemployment rate. Column 4 further
introduces controls for job and employer attributes. Interestingly, the magnitude of the
impact of labor market knowledge imperfections on wages is reduced—each percentage
point misperception of the unemployment rate is now associated with a wage decline of
0.4%—suggesting that part of the impact of misinformation on wages operates through
worker matching to lower quality jobs.
In labor economics, information misperceptions fall under the category of “labor mar-
ket frictions” that prevent or delay the matching of job vacancies and unemployed
workers, according to search and matching models. However, both the theoretical and
empirical modeling tend to bundle together frictions such as mobility costs, skill mis-
matches, and lack of information on job requirements and wages offered or labor market
tightness. Therefore, despite underlining the relevance of information flows, this line of
literature has not so far analyzed the determinants of the role of inaccurate information
per se.
Note that the coefficient estimates on the control variables fit what is widely known
from traditional wage regressions, in terms of both signs and magnitudes. The gender
wage penalty ranges from 15 to 24 log points, depending on the set of control variables
included in the model. The age earnings profile is concave, peaking around age 45 (results
in column 4, which includes controls for job and firm attributes, asmost often found in the
literature). Tertiary education yields a large return over upper secondary education, in the
order of 13 to 14 log points (in column 4, see the difference between the return to tertiary
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and upper secondary education) (for an overview of the effect of educational levels on
earnings, see Psacharopoulos 1994). Introducing controls for the worker ability as proxied
by its capacity to understand the survey questions (column 3) does not change the sign or
magnitude of the coefficients previously estimated, while pointing to a wage premium for
more able workers (ability2); nevertheless, the impact of ability becomes non-significant
once we account for the job characteristics, firm characteristics, and worker broad occu-
pation. Larger firms pay higher wages. Part-time work is associated with lower wages,
either because there is a penalty on hourly wages for part-time work or, by construction,
when relying on earnings data instead of hourly wages. The impact of individual trade
union membership, though positive, is not significant, as would be expected in European
countries, where extension of collective bargaining contracts to non-unionized workers
is widespread. Workers performing supervisory tasks earn a wage premium of approxi-
mately 12%; those on open-ended contracts earn a wage premium of 21%.11 Married or
cohabiting workers earn higher wages, consistent with the literature on the marital-status
wage premium (Blackburn and Korenman 1994). All of these estimates are very robust to
the introduction of controls for the regional unemployment rate in Table 3. The fact that
the estimates of the coefficients on the other variables included in the model fit remark-
ably well the expectations drawn from the profusion of literature on wage regressions in
general, and the regional wage curve in particular, points to the reliability of the procedure
followed to infer earnings data from the ESS data.
5.1 Robustness checks
Robustness checks within the interval regression setting are presented in the Appendix
Table 6. We depart from the regressions that included the control for the regional
unemployment rate (Table 3) and consider the relative gap in the perception of the unem-
ployment rate, computed according to Eq. 2, instead of the absolute gap. We consistently
find that workers who have a pessimistic view of labor market opportunities earn lower
wages, with an elasticity of wages with respect to the distance between perceived and
actual unemployment rate of −.137 to −.093. Moreover, we still find that an optimistic
view of labor market opportunities has no significant impact on wages (formal tests on
the sum of the coefficients in the two first lines of each model). The regional unemploy-
ment elasticity of pay changes little, just like the estimated coefficients on all other control
variables.
It would also make sense to rely on an estimation strategy that considers the ordered
nature of the outcome variable, but not the exact thresholds between categories, to the
extent that these may be measured with error. We do so by estimating ordered pro-
bit models (reported in the Appendix Tables 7 and 8). Results are in line with those on
interval regression. In general, an increase in the unemployment misperception increases
the probability that the labor income will fall on the four lowest brackets; conversely, it
decreases the probability that the worker’s earnings belong to the remaining six upper
brackets. To have a specific example, consider specification 5: a 10 percentage point
increase in the unemployment misperception translates into a 5% increase in the prob-
ability of belonging to the bottom part of the distribution (first four categories) and a 5
% decrease in the probability of belonging to the remaining six categories. Results of the
estimation of the ordered probit therefore confirm those on interval regression.
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5.2 A potential mechanism? Misperceptions of the labor market situation and worker’s
career decisions
A gap between the country’s unemployment rate perceived by a worker and the actual
unemployment rate provides a measure of misunderstanding of the degree of labor mar-
ket tightness by the worker. This misperception is bound to affect individual behavior
in the labor market—to the extent that a pessimistic view is associated with concern
over becoming unemployed, it is expected to influence decisions such as that on the
reservation wage. Whereas there is no data available that would enable a full test of this
hypothesis, we can nevertheless explore whether the misperception of the unemployment
rate is associated with an individual’s expectation of becoming unemployed. Such evi-
dence would provide a possible channel for the misperceptions on the situation of the
labor market to impact wages.
Participants in the survey were asked, “how likely it is that during the next 12 months
you will be unemployed and looking for work for at least four consecutive weeks?” (ESS
2008c, p. 35). The possible answers were the following: very likely, likely, not likely, and
not at all likely. We generate a dummy variable that takes value one if the answer was
“very likely” or “likely” and zero otherwise. We estimate the probability of a positive
answer as a function of the unemployment misperception and a set of covariates, con-
trolling for country fixed effects. The covariates include the actual unemployment rate in
the country (which varies depending on the survey month) and the worker’s age, gender,
education, and ability, as well as her current labor market status (dummy for unemployed,
with employed as the omitted category, and a dummy with value one if the individual is
employed on a permanent contract and zero otherwise). This set of regressors replicates
those in our major specification of the wage model, in column 3 of Table 2, augmented to
include the job attribute that is expected to have a direct impact on perceptions of future
unemployment, namely the duration of the current employment contract (open-ended, as
opposed to short duration). The regressions were run both on the sample of active popu-
lation (in which case, we further control for the current unemployment status) and on the
analysis sample, which includes only employed workers. Results are reported in Table 4.
For the active population, the covariates that describe the working status have signs
aligned with expectations. Being unemployed increases the most the perceived likelihood
of future unemployment. Having a permanent contract points in the opposite direction,
even though the absolute magnitude of the effect is smaller. More educated individu-
als show less concern over the possibility of being unemployed. No significant gender
differences are detected.
The coefficient of the unemployment misperception is significant and positive—the
overestimation of the unemployment rate is associated with a higher perceived probability
of being unemployed in the near future. Conversely, the underestimation of the country’s
unemployment rate is associated with a lower perceived probability of being unemployed
in the near future (though significant only at the 10 % level).
For the working population, those on an open-ended contract are less likely to believe
they will be unemployed in the near future. Just like for the active population as a whole,
we find that the overestimation of the unemployment rate is associated with a higher per-
ceived probability of being unemployed in the near future. For those who underestimate
the unemployment rate, in turn, we cannot reject the hypothesis that such misperception
has no impact on their perceived likelihood of being unemployed in the next 12months.12
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Table 4 Perceived probability of being unemployed within the next 12 months, probit model
All active population Analysis sample
Coef. Marg. impact Coef. Marg. impact
Misperception unemployment (abs value) .007*** .002*** .011*** .003***
(.002) (.000) (.004) (.001)
Misperc. unempl. if neg. (abs value) −.040** −.011** −.024 −.005
(.020) (.006) (.048) (.012)
Female −.003 −.001 −.089 −.022
(.042) (.012) (.110) (.026)
Age .015 .004 .032 .008
(.012) (.003) (.034) (.008)
Age sq. −.0003* −.00007* −.0004 −.0001
(.0001) (.00004) (.0004) (.0001)
Educ. upper second. −.140** −.039** .111 .0274
(.061) (.0171) (.153) (.038)
Educ. tertiary −.385*** −.104*** −.260* −.062*
(.062) (.016) (.157) (.037)
Ability1 −.010 −.003 −.064 −.016
(.089) (.026) (.229) (.059)
Ability2 −.198*** −.058*** −.071 −.018
(.049) (.015) (.126) (.032)
Unemployed 1.646*** .586***
(.084) (.026)
Open end contract −.394*** −.119*** −.756*** −.227***
(.044) (.014) (.121) (.041)
Const. −.607** −.649
(.255) (.702)
Controls for country fixed effects Yes Yes
Obs. 13573 2262
Log L −5415.8 −753.8
Source: Computations are based on ESS (2008). Notes: The model uses ESS post-stratification weights combined with population
size weights. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Columns 1 and 2 are computed on the active population sample
(employed and unemployed respondents) in the 16 countries under analysis; columns 3 and 4 are computed on the analysis
sample of employed workers. Marginal impacts are computed at the mean values and considering the change in each dummy
variable from zero to one. Asterisks indicate statistically significant parameters at *10 %, **5 %, and ***1 % levels
These results suggest that the misperception of a national phenomenon—the coun-
try unemployment rate—is associated with expectations about one’s own labor market
prospects. Therefore, the information gap is likely to affect labor market choices, in
particular the definition of the wage threshold for a job offer to be deemed acceptable.
This finding provides a potential mechanism for the impact of information mispercep-
tions on the wage level. The predictions of Diamond (1982) under the job search and
matching theory can help explain this mechanism. According to this author, the matching
process in the labor market yields multiple equilibria that are rankable according to the
aggregate welfare of the two sides. The equilibria depend on the rational expectation that
employers have about the future: if the employers are optimistic, more job vacancies are
created and the unemployment rate decreases; in the pessimistic case, the number of job
vacancies is low and unemployment is high. Similarly, we can think of the argument from
a worker’s perspective: if workers are pessimistic about the job opportunities the labor
market has to offer (e.g., they overestimate the unemployment rate), their expectations
about their employment chances in the near future and wages are lower. Employers could
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exploit this information friction, having more bargaining power that would allow them to
offer lower wages.
6 Conclusions
We contribute to the empirical literature on the impact of misperceptions, by showing
that they affect an individual’s actual labor market outcomes. We estimate wage regres-
sions including worker attributes, as well as firm and job attributes, augmented to include
our key variable of interest, the degree of misperception by the worker of the labor mar-
ket tightness. We adopt a threefold strategy to tackle potential endogeneity problems:
controlling for worker ability, including country fixed effects, and controlling for the
unemployment rate in the region of residence.
Our results lend support to the claim that a worker’s knowledge of labor market con-
ditions is crucial: “The information a man possesses on the labor market is capital: it was
produced at the cost of search, and it yields a higher wage rate than on average would be
received in its absence” (Stigler 1962, p. 103). We find that workers’ pessimistic view of
the labor market situation lowers their wages—-each 1 percentage point deviation of the
perceived unemployment rate from the actual one translates into a reduction in wages of
0.7 % (0.4 % once we control for job and employer attributes). This result is very robust to
alternative specifications of the model. In turn, an optimistic view of the labor market has
no significant impact on wages.We discuss possible mechanisms driving these results. An
overestimation of the unemployment rate leads to concern over one’s own future employ-
ment prospects and is therefore likely to reduce perceived bargaining power, lowering
reservation wages; its underestimation, on the contrary, could raise reservation wages,
but it would render job finding more difficult.
Endnotes
1 In the terminology of the data producer, we have used the Integrated File that merges
all countries with comparable data, edition 4.3.
2 We used weighted data when computing these percentages of non-response items.
3 Results on the probit model estimated are available from the authors upon request.
4 Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, The
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, and the UK.
5 Working age: the age from which people are legally entitled to work up to retirement
age. Unemployed: people who cannot find paid work (ESS 2008c, p. 25). We disregard
the subtlety that the total population is the denominator respondents were asked to con-
sider, instead of the active population, as we believe the question was phrased in the
simplest and least technical way possible to capture the respondent’s perception of the
unemployment rate.
6 Defined as the start of the interview (which coincides with the end moment in
virtually all cases).
7 We implemented yet another robustness check. According to our core index of mis-
perception of the unemployment rate (Eq. 1), a deviation of the actual unemployment
rate from the midpoint of the perception interval will be coded as a (small) mispercep-
tion, even though the actual ratemay fall within that interval.We computed an alternative
index by recoding the misperception to zero whenever the actual unemployment rate fell
anywhere on the perceived interval. In this case, the share of workers with negative or
positive misperception naturally declines (to 5 and 73%, respectively, from the 9 and 78%
reported in Table 1). Accordingly, the share of respondents with an accurate perception
rises to 22% from 13%. We also re-estimated our model of the impact of misperceptions
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on wages using this alternative index. Results do not change (no coefficient changes
its significance level, and the few coefficients that change magnitude do so at the third
decimal place). These results are available from the authors upon request.
8 NUTS—Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics.
9 The estimation sample includes both the employed and unemployed population, as it
seems a more sensible sample on which to evaluate the determinants of unemployment
misperceptions. Estimation on the analysis sample of employed workers yields coeffi-
cients with the same sign, similar magnitudes, but non-significant results on ability and
the regional unemployment rate.
10 We have also computed the gap between the perceived unemployment rate and the
regional unemployment rate (instead of the national). We find that both gaps are highly
correlated (coefficient above .98) and a formal test cannot reject the equality of their
means.
11 Either one computed as exp(β) − 1.
12 The coefficient on the negative misperception (line 2) is very imprecisely estimated.
Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the impact of the underestimation of the
unemployment rate is zero (sum of the coefficients in lines 1 and 2), just like we cannot
reject that it is equal to the impact of overestimation of the unemployment rate.
Appendix
Table 5Misperceptions of unemployment, interval regression
(1) (2)
Educ. upper second. −4.179*** −4.063***
(.542) (.541)












Age sq. .005*** .005***
(.001) (.001)
Region. unempl. rate .321***
(.058)





Log L −31981.8 −32000.9
σ 12.9 12.9
Source: Computations are based on ESS (2008). Notes: ability1 equals one if the respondent understood the questions very often
or often and zero otherwise; ability2 equals one if the respondent never or almost never required clarifications on the questions
and zero otherwise. The interval regression uses ESS post-stratification weights combined with population size weights. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. The computations are performed on the active population sample (employed and
unemployed respondents) in the 12 countries with available data on regional unemployment rates. Asterisks indicate statistically
significant parameters at ** 5% and *** 1% levels
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Table 6 Interval regression, (log) wages on (log) misperception of unemployment, including control
for the regional unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Log) ratio misperc. unempl. (abs value) −.132*** −.137*** −.136*** −.093*** −.098***
(.023) (.023) (.024) (.022) (.022)
(Log) ratio misp. unemp. if neg. (abs value) .110** .110** .054 .056
(.046) (.046) (.045) (.048)
(Log) regional unempl. rate −.128** −.127** −.128** −.102** −.096**
(.051) (.051) (.050) (.044) (.043)
Female −.239*** −.235*** −.233*** −.185*** −.146***
(.030) (.030) (.030) (.031) (.032)
Age .025*** .025*** .026*** .019** .012
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.008) (.008)
Age sq. −.0002** −.0002** −.0002** −.0002* −.0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.00009) (.0001)
Educ. upper second. .158*** .158*** .150*** .047 .051
(.046) (.046) (.046) (.040) (.040)
Educ. tertiary .433*** .428*** .416*** .181*** .179***
(.047) (.046) (.046) (.046) (.046)
Ability1 −.012 −.069 −.085
(.087) (.084) (.087)
Ability2 .062* −.0008 .011
(.032) (.029) (.029)
Firm size 100–500 .069** .057*
(.032) (.031)








Open end contract .193*** .174***
(.036) (.036)




Const. 7.007*** 7.009*** 6.971*** 6.842*** 6.932***
(.214) (.213) (.225) (.206) (.203)
Controls for
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry (4 dummies) No No No Yes Yes
Occupation (3 dummies) No No No Yes Yes
Obs. 1700 1700 1695 1673 1673
Log L −3450.9 −3447.1 −3441.5 −3207.1 −3174.8
σ .411 .410 .409 .364 .356
Source: Computations are based on ESS (2008). Notes: The relative misperception index is computed according to Eq. 2 (i.e., the
difference between (log) perceived unemployment rate and (log) actual unemployment rate in the country); its absolute value is
the regressor in line 1; in line 2, it is interacted with a dummy variable equal to one if the relative misperception index is negative
and zero otherwise. The computations use ESS post-stratification weights combined with population size weights. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistically significant parameters at *10 %, **5 %, and ***1 % levels
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Table 7 Ordered probit, (log) wages on level of misperception of unemployment, including control
for the regional unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Misperception unemployment (abs value) −.017*** −.016*** −.016*** −.012*** −.013***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Misperc. unempl. if neg. (abs value) .034 .034 .010 .010
(.027) (.027) (.030) (.033)
(Log) regional unempl. rate −.304** −.305** −.307** −.274** −.263**
(.126) (.126) (.125) (.123) (.120)
Female −.573*** −.570*** −.566*** −.502*** −.409***
(.071) (.071) (.071) (.082) (.087)
Age .058*** .058*** .060*** .049** .030
(.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.023)
Age sq. −.0005** −.0005** −.0006** −.0005* −.0002
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
Educ. upper second. .367*** .372*** .354*** .115 .131
(.114) (.114) (.113) (.112) (.114)
Educ. tertiary 1.033*** 1.035*** 1.010*** .500*** .510***
(.118) (.118) (.118) (.126) (.130)
Ability1 −.019 −.163 −.211
(.211) (.228) (.241)
Ability2 .129* −.025 .005
(.078) (.080) (.082)
Firm size 100–500 .207** .177**
(.086) (.085)








Open end contract .556*** .515***
(.101) (.102)





Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry (4 dummies) No No No Yes Yes
Occupation (3 dummies) No No No Yes Yes
Obs. 1700 1700 1695 1673 1673
Log L −3420.7 −3419.8 −3414.9 −3177.1 −3145.1
Source: Computations are based on ESS (2008). Notes: The misperception index is computed according to Eq. 1 (i.e., the
difference between the perceived and the actual unemployment rate in the country); its absolute value is the regressor in line 1;
in line 2, the absolute value of the misperception index is interacted with a dummy variable equal to one if the misperception is
negative and zero otherwise. The computations use ESS post-stratification weights combined with population size weights.









Table 8Marginal effects ordered probit, (log) wages on level of misperception of unemployment, including control for the regional unemployment rate
Interval1 Interval2 Interval3 Interval4 Interval5 Interval6 Interval7 Interval8 Interval9 Interval10
(1) 0.00076 0.00206 0.00245 0.00131 −0.00017 −0.00095 −0.00152 −0.00150 −0.00128 −0.00116
0.00017 0.00038 0.00048 0.00028 0.00010 0.00021 0.00031 0.00031 0.00025 0.00025
(2) 0.00073 0.00199 0.00238 0.00127 −0.00016 −0.00092 −0.00147 −0.00145 −0.00124 −0.00113
0.00017 0.00038 0.00048 0.00028 0.00010 0.00021 0.00031 0.00031 0.00025 0.00025
(3) 0.00072 0.00198 0.00237 0.00127 −0.00016 −0.00092 −0.00147 −0.00145 −0.00123 −0.00111
0.00017 0.00038 0.00048 0.00028 0.00010 0.00020 0.00031 0.00031 0.00025 0.00025
(4) 0.00030 0.00129 0.00198 0.00111 −0.00019 −0.00085 −0.00125 −0.00109 −0.00078 −0.00052
0.00010 0.00035 0.00055 0.00032 0.00010 0.00025 0.00035 0.00032 0.00021 0.00016
(5) 0.00030 0.00136 0.00216 0.00119 −0.00026 −0.00096 −0.00137 −0.00115 −0.00079 −0.00049
0.00009 0.00035 0.00057 0.00033 0.00012 0.00027 0.00037 0.00032 0.00020 0.00014
Source: Computations are based on ESS (2008). Robust standard errors are in italics. Each line (labeled from (1) to (5) ) corresponds to the equivalent model specification reported in Table 7
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